In Federal Republic of Nigeria and another v Williams [2025] EWHC 2217 (Comm), the English High Court granted an anti-enforcement injunction (‘AEI’) preventing the enforcement in New York of an English default judgment valued at USD15 million. It is a significant decision because it appears to be the first reported instance of an AEI granted to restrain the enforcement of an English judgment as opposed to a foreign judgment.

Background

In 2018, the Defendant (‘Dr Williams’) obtained a default judgment from the English High Court against the Federal Government of Nigeria and the Attorney General of the Federal Government of Nigeria (the ‘FGN’) for c. USD15 million (plus costs) (the ‘Default Judgment’). The FGN applied to set aside the Default Judgment on the basis that it was obtained fraudulently. However, pending determination of the set-aside application, Dr Williams moved to enforce the Default Judgment in New York. The FGN subsequently sought an AEI, contending that enforcement of the Default Judgment in New York, prior to the determination of the set-aside proceedings in England, would be vexatious and oppressive.

Principles

It is well established that the English court has the power to grant an AEI to restrain a party from seeking to enforce a foreign judgment, even in respect of enforcement in other foreign countries. AEIs are rarely granted as delay and/or comity considerations usually make it inappropriate to grant such an injunction.

On this occasion, however, Henshaw J saw no principled reason why an AEI should not be available in respect of an English judgment. His Honour noted that some of the comity considerations applicable to the enforcement of foreign judgments are less likely to arise when an AEI is granted by an English court in respect of an English judgment.

Applicable test

The court also had to consider the applicable test to be applied where an AEI is sought, not on contractual grounds, but on the basis that enforcement of the Default Judgment before the outcome of the set aside proceedings would be vexatious and oppressive.

The applicable test will likely be determined by whether the injunction is to be granted on a temporary basis to ‘hold the ring’ pending a further hearing or trial, or (in effect) to determine the issue. In this case, it would not have made any difference as Henshaw J found that the higher threshold was met.

Decision

Henshaw J granted the AEI for the following reasons:

1. the FGN’s case on the merits was, on the face of it, a strong one so there was a compelling case that enforcing the Default Judgment in New York, before the English court had determined the set-aside application for fraud, would be vexatious and oppressive;
2. the AEI would not determine the appropriate forum for the dispute instead it would suspend enforcement proceedings pending the outcome of the set-aside proceedings. Henshaw J noted that if the ‘high probability’ test were to apply, on the current evidence, it is highly probable that the FGN would succeed at trial in establishing that an AEI should be granted;
3. there would be a risk of irreparable prejudice to the FGN if Dr Williams were permitted to enforce the Default Judgment and this outweighed the more limited prejudice to Dr Williams that would result from granting an AEI; and
4. there was no issue of comity as this was not a case in which the FGN sought to prevent enforcement of a judgment already issued by a foreign court. Rather, the injunction was intended to protect the integrity of the English court’s own process and to prevent its judgment from being used as an instrument of fraud.

Comment

This decision highlights that AEIs may be available not only to restrain a party from enforcing a foreign court order or judgment, but also to prevent enforcement of an order or judgment issued by an English court.

While AEIs are rare because of issues of comity, such issues are likely to be of limited relevance in the context of an AEI to prevent enforcement of an English judgment overseas, where the purpose of the injunction is to protect the integrity of the English court’s own process, rather than those of a foreign court.

The case also provides useful guidance on the relevant test to be applied where an interim AEI or ASI is sought on non-contractual grounds.

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